The battle had turned out nearly as Howe wished it to. He had once again bested Washington and the road to Philadelphia was now open, although the Continental army had again escaped destruction. Howe had been slow to pursue and Washington quick to run. Howe would march into Philadelphia on 26 September 1777 and occupy it until the following spring. Its fall hurt but did not cripple the patriot cause. Even in defeat, Washington sought an opportunity to turn the tables on Howe before the end of the campaign season. He would nearly do so at Germantown, the subject of the second volume in McGuire's history of the campaign.
The pros far outweigh the cons in this masterful work. McGuire's writing flows easily. More impressive is the author's command of source materials. A review of his bibliography and footnotes demonstrates that he has been to all of the major archival holdings in the United States as well as the United Kingdom. He has also employed the latest in secondary source materials. In terms of scope, this is no general's history of a campaign. Whether general or private, farm girl or Luthern minister, McGuire has woven their views of the campaign together, using logically based assumptions to account for the discrepancies in the primary documents. If there are problems with the volume, they are not major. His maps are good but not great. Perhaps a better cartographer would be in order should this go to another edition. There are a few minor irritants in the printed copy not the least of which was the decision on the part of the publisher to use a capital I instead of a 1 in any numerical entries. This too should be corrected in a second edition. Taken as a totality, this is the best account of Brandywine that I know of in print. After receiving his orders from Lee, Stuart began his ride around the Union army as he pushed further eastward toward Washington. Several historians, as well as Stuart, argued that the presence of Union scouts and the crowded roads from both armies forced Stuart to adjust his path. However, Robinson maintains that Stuart could have moved northward along the Blue Ridge Mountains and would have only incurred minimal Union resistance. Although Stuart acknowledged within his reports that he clearly understood the objectives given to him by Lee, Robinson asserts that Stuart's actions did not coincide with such acknowledgements, as Stuart participated in several events that delayed his arrival at Gettysburg. Citing Stuart's absence prior to Gettysburg, Robinson argues that the lack of information caused Lee to become hesitant during the first day of Gettysburg. Although some historians argue that Lee did not act like himself during the battle of Gettysburg, Robinson attributes Lee's passivity to the lack of accurate reconnaissance. Therefore, Robinson asserts that Lee did not fully commit his forces during the first day of the battle because he was waiting for word from Stuart. Following the war, supporters of Stuart argued that Lee could have utilized other cavalry for reconnaissance, but Robinson maintains that Lee placed greater confidence in Stuart's reports. Robinson concludes that while Stuart did not disobey Lee's orders, the cavalry commander failed to explicitly follow the commands as Lee expected.
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While Robinson's work will promote a renewed interest in the different perspectives of warfare and Gettysburg, Robinson's study does contain several factual errors, including Robinson's assertion that Lee began his Gettysburg campaign on June 9 rather than June 3. Despite these inaccuracies, Robinson's book provides an intriguing analysis of the essential role of affective communication when conducting warfare. While historians will never fully agree on whether Stuart fully disobeyed Lee's orders, Robinson's study reminds us that no Civil War general was ever infallible. 
